"The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights"
Working paper prepared by Mr. Marc Bossuyt
United Nations
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights21 June 2000
The following is an excerpt from the working paper prepared by Marc Bossuyt for the U.N. Sub-Commission (U.N. Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33). To download the full report from the U.N. website, click here. To learn more about the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, click here.
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IV. SANCTIONS CASE STUDIES
58. The following case studies focus on the sanctions regimes imposed upon three countries, Iraq, Burundi and Cuba. The foregoing discussion of international law, especially the "six-prong test", will be applied to each of these situations. The selection of these three nations is based mainly upon the massive international protest they have each spurred. The three cases are also exemplary as one involves Security Council-imposed multilateral sanctions, one involves regionally-imposed sanctions and one unilaterally-imposed sanctions. In each case, general information will be provided about the sanctions regime, followed by an examination of the effects of the sanctions on civilians, the public response to the sanctions regimes and, finally, an evaluation of the legal standing of the sanctions in the light of international law.
A. Iraq
59. The sanctions against Iraq are the most comprehensive, total sanctions that have ever been imposed on a country. The situation at present is extremely grave. The transportation, power and communication infrastructures were decimated during the Gulf war, and have not been rebuilt owing to the sanctions. The industrial sector is also in shambles and agricultural production has suffered greatly. But most alarming is the health crisis that has erupted since the imposition of the sanctions.
1. Implementation of sanctions
60. The Security Council imposed multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions in its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990. Under the sanctions all imports and exports to and from Iraq were banned, exemptions being allowed for supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in certain circumstances, foodstuffs.38 The Security Council imposed marine and air blockades in its resolutions 665 (1990) and 670 (1990).
61. Following the Gulf war, the Security Council, in its resolution 687 (1991) authorized the continuation of sanctions, with the same humanitarian caveats. The Sanctions Committee was authorized to permit imports of petroleum originating from Iraq, in order to enable Iraq to pay for imports of foodstuffs, medicines and essential civilian supplies. In resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council also imposed a comprehensive arms embargo and established a technical commission of experts (UNSCOM) to monitor and destroy the weapons of mass destruction of Iraq.
62. In 1991, the Council adopted resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), authorizing the sale of up to $1.6 billion worth of petroleum and petroleum products by Iraq each six months. The resolutions were never implemented and it was not until 1996 that the "oil-for-food programme" came into effect. Resolution 986 (1995) permitted the sale of $2 billion of Iraqi oil over 180 days, the proceeds from which were to be placed in a United Nations-controlled bank account. Of the revenues from the sale, however, only about half ended up going towards the purchase of humanitarian goods, the majority of the rest going towards reparations and administrative costs. This resolution was implemented with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat and the Government of Iraq on 20 May 1996. The programme went into effect 10 December 1996. Although it was conceived of as a temporary measure, the "oil-for-food" scheme is still in effect, having been extended several times. The amount Iraq is allowed to sell was increased considerably in resolution 1153 (1998), and the cap was dropped altogether in December 1999 in resolution 1284 (1999). More money has also been allowed for the repair of Iraq's greatly damaged oil industry. However, this mitigation of the sanctions is in no way a solution to the crisis; as the United Nations Secretary-General stated in March 2000, "Even if it [the oil-for-food programme] is implemented perfectly, it is possible that our efforts will prove insufficient to satisfy the population's needs".39
2. Effects on civilians
63. As has been documented by United Nations agencies, NGOs, humanitarian and human rights organizations, researchers and political leaders, the sanctions upon Iraq have produced a humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst catastrophes of the past decades. There is broad controversy and little hard evidence concerning the exact number of deaths directly attributable to the sanctions; estimates range from half a million to a million and a half, with the majority of the dead being children. It should be emphasized that much of the controversy around the number of deaths is only serving to obfuscate the fact that any deaths at all caused by the sanctions regime indicate grave breaches of humanitarian law and are unacceptable.
64. In 1999, after conducting the first surveys since 1991 of child and maternal mortality in Iraq, UNICEF concluded that in the heavily-populated southern and central parts of the country, children under five are dying at more than twice the rate they were 10 years ago.40 An expert on the effects of sanctions on civilians states that "the underlying causes of these excess deaths include contaminated water, lack of high quality foods, inadequate breastfeeding, poor weaning practices, and inadequate supplies in the curative health-care system".41 The lack of food due to sanctions translated into a 32 per cent drop in per capita calorie intake compared to before the Gulf war.42 According to the Government of Iraq, by 1997, only half of the water treatment capacity of the country was operational.43
65. Owing to the lack of medical supplies, it was estimated that, by 1997, 30 per cent of hospital beds were out of use, 75 per cent of all hospital equipment did not work and 25 per cent of Iraq's 1,305 health centres were closed.44 A recent Security Council-appointed panel summarized the health and sanitation situation as follows:
"In marked contrast to the prevailing situation prior to the events of 1990-1991, the infant mortality rates in Iraq today are among the highest in the world, low infant birth weight affects at least 23 per cent of all births, chronic malnutrition affects every fourth child under five years of age, only 41 per cent of the population have regular access to clean water, 83 per cent of all schools need substantial repairs. The ICRC states that the Iraqi health-care system is today in a decrepit state. UNDP calculates that it would take 7 billion US dollars to rehabilitate the power sector country-wide to its 1990 capacity."45
66. Although some note a slow improvement in health and nutrition indicators since 1997,46 the disaster and deaths continue, and even as recently as March 2000, the Secretary-General expressed particular concern for the plight of Iraqi children.47
67. The health crisis in Iraq is intertwined with the general social and economic crises which the sanctions have prompted. Even if the deaths were to cease as the result of humanitarian exemptions (as the Secretary-General and others deem impossible), there would still be massive, systematic violations of Iraqi citizens' other rights attributable to the sanctions. The economic, social and cultural rights of the Iraqi people are being swept aside, as are their rights to development and to education. For example, the purchasing power of an Iraqi salary by the mid-1990s was about 5 per cent of its value prior to 199048 and, as the United Nations Development Programme field office recognized, "the country has experienced a shift from relative affluence to massive poverty".49 The previous advances in education and literacy have been completely reversed over the past 10 years. As Denis Halliday, former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, declared after his resignation in September 1998, "sanctions have had a serious impact on the Iraqi extended family system. We're seeing an increase in single-parent families, usually mothers struggling alone. There's an increase in divorce. Many families have had to sell their homes, furniture and other possessions to put food on the table, resulting in homelessness. Many young people are resorting to prostitution".50 In addition, crime has risen and emigration has skyrocketed. Researchers have also shown how sanctions have an overwhelmingly greater negative medical and social impact on women, as women bear the brunt of the social and economic displacements and upheaval.51
3. The response to sanctions
68. The outcry against the sanctions on Iraq has come from all sides. From within the United Nations, the Secretary-General himself has been at the forefront of the criticism, levelling serious charges against the sanctions regime in his report to the Security Council of 10 March 2000 (S/2000/208) and stating two weeks later that "the Council should seek every opportunity to alleviate the suffering of the population, who after all are not the intended targets of sanctions".52 The sanctions have led to the resignation of three United Nations officials, two this year alone. First, Denis Halliday, former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, resigned in September 1998, declaring: "We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral."53 Hans von Sponeck, Halliday's successor as Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, resigned on 13 February 2000, explaining that he could not any longer be associated with a programme that prolonged the sufferings of the people and which had no chance to meet even the basic needs of the civilian population.54 Two days later, Jutta Burghardt, head of the World Food Programme in Iraq, also resigned, stating "I fully support what Mr. von Sponeck is saying".55
69. Both in the Security Council, the body which has supposedly provided legitimization to the sanctions regime, and in other United Nations forums, a number of countries have expressed concerns over the impact of the sanctions; they include Brazil, China, Egypt, the Republic of Korea, Kenya, France, Russia and Slovenia.
70. The sanctions have also produced an outcry from civil society. Ending the sanctions has become a focus for NGOs, human rights groups and humanitarian organizations across the world and demonstrations, petitions, lobbying campaigns and conferences have been devoted to the issue. Civil society groups have sprung up whose sole purpose is to end the sanctions and which have worked to bring together academics, activists and political leaders who share that goal. At the Commission on Human Rights, there have been a multitude of statements condemning the sanctions.56 Many groups have defied the embargo and brought humanitarian aid to Iraq in acts of international civil disobedience.57 In legal terms, this popular protest is clearly establishing the "dictates of the public conscience".
4. Iraqi sanctions and international law
71. The sanctions regime against Iraq is unequivocally illegal under existing international humanitarian law and human rights law. Some would go as far as making a charge of genocide.58 Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which entered into force on 12 January 1951, defines genocide as follows:
"Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
..."
72. The sanctions regime against Iraq has as its clear purpose the deliberate infliction on the Iraqi people of conditions of life (lack of adequate food, medicines, etc.) calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. It does not matter that this deliberate physical destruction has as its ostensible objective the security of the region. Once clear evidence was available that thousands of civilians were dying and that hundreds of thousands would die in the future as the Security Council continued the sanctions, the deaths were no longer an unintended side effect - the Security Council was responsible for all known consequences of its actions. The sanctioning bodies cannot be absolved from having the "intent to destroy" the Iraqi people. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations in fact admitted this; when questioned whether the half million deaths were "worth it", she replied: "we think the price is worth it".59 The States imposing the sanctions could raise questions under the genocide Convention.
73. Any sanctions that are imposed as a result of war or as a part of war are regulated by the laws of armed conflict.60 Of course, the "six-prong test" is still applicable, but in the Iraqi case it must be interpreted in the light of established armed conflict law. The sanctions against Iraq were first imposed in the context of Iraq's military invasion of Kuwait, were maintained during the Gulf war and then were extended indefinitely after the first phase of military hostilities ended. Also, the continued air strikes by United States and United Kingdom planes qualify the situation as an armed conflict. Thus, the strict measures stipulated in international humanitarian law for the protection of civilians in armed conflict is applicable to the sanctions regime and its instigators, and violations of those laws can be prosecuted as war crimes. In this vein, reference should be made to the argument presented earlier under "Limits to sanctions in humanitarian law", especially the section on the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Particularly germane are the provisions of the Geneva Conventions allowing for exemptions for medical supplies and for goods needed for the survival of the civilian population, the prohibition in Protocol I, article 54, paragraph 1, of "starvation of civilians as a method of warfare", and the provisions relating to the protection of women and children, the two groups most injured by the sanctions regime. Finally, humanitarian law, in accordance with the Martens Clause, clearly establishes that the "dictates of the public conscience" are to be considered binding in cases where the law is not specific. The popular outcry against the sanctions, as mentioned above, constitutes these dictates, rendering the sanctions illegal.
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Notes
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38 In its resolution 666 (1990), the Security Council established that the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee had the sole power to determine whether humanitarian circumstances mandated the provision of foodstuffs.
39 Press release SG/SM/7338 (24 March 2000).
40 UNICEF press release CF/DOC/PR/1999/29 (12 August 1999). UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy said at the press conference that the findings reveal "an ongoing humanitarian emergency".
41 Richard Garfield, "Morbidity and mortality among Iraqi children from 1990 through 1998: assessing the impact of the Gulf war and economic sanctions", unpaginated, July 1999, available on Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq webpage, < http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi>.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 "Report of the second panel established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq", S/1999/356, annex II (30 March 1999).
46 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1143 (1997) (S/1998/477), 5 June 1998.
47 Press release SG/SM/7338 (24 March 2000).
48 UNICEF, Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq, Baghdad, 30 April 1998, quoted in Garfield, "Morbidity ...".
49 S/1999/356, annex II.
50 Speech delivered by Denis Halliday on Capitol Hill, 6 October 1998. From Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq webpage <http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/halliday/quotes.html>.
51 See Nadje Al-Ali, "Sanctions and women in Iraq", "Sanctions on Iraq: background, consequences, strategies", in Proceedings of Conference sponsored by Committee Against Sanctions on Iraq, 13-14 November, Cambridge, pp. 73-84.
52 Press release SG/SM/7338 (24 March 2000).
53 Independent, 15 October 1998.
54 Reuters, "Top UN official leaves Iraq, says programme failed", 17 February 2000.
55 Washington Post, "Aide who quit in protest plans report on airstrikes on Iraq", 17 February 2000.
56 See note 4, above.
57 Ramsey Clark, although among many, is perhaps one of the most famous individuals to have personally defied the blockade.
58 For an in-depth discussion of genocide and other possible violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, see Elias Davidsson, "The economic sanctions against the people of Iraq: consequences and legal findings", available at: <http://www.juscogens.org>, or <http://www.lancs.ac.uk/ug/greenrd/project/elias.htm>.
59 "Punishing Saddam", in 60 Minutes, 12 May 1996. The interview went as follows: Lesley Stahl (referring to sanctions against Iraq): "We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, and you know, is the price worth it?" Madeleine Albright: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price is worth it."
60 See the section entitled "Limitations to sanctions in humanitarian law" of the present working paper.
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